Dealpoint - Avoiding Conflict

From this Wednesday 1 October 2008 directors of UK registered companies come under a new positive duty to avoid situations in which they have (or can have) a direct or indirect interest that conflicts with (or possibly may conflict with) their company's interests.

This new duty is broadly similar to the existing common law duties directors have to avoid placing themselves in positions of conflict. However, the wording of the new duty is arguably wider than the previous common law duty. This and the fact that the duty is now set out in black and white in primary legislation means that directors will be more minded than ever to avoid inadvertently breaching this duty to avoid 'Situational Conflicts'.

Breach of the duty might result in the company having a right of action against the director, with possible remedies including the setting aside of transactions, damages and injunctions. Allegations of breach are most likely to arise in circumstances where companies are in financial difficulty or a formal insolvency process such as liquidation or administration.

What is a Situational Conflict?

The legislation does not set out what situations will be caught, which will depend upon the specific circumstances in any case. However, common day-to-day examples might include:

  • Directors being involved in some way with a business that might compete with their company.
  • Directors being trustees of the company's pension scheme or directors of the company's pension trustee company.
  • Directors being involved with customers of, or suppliers to their company.
  • Directors owning property or assets unconnected to their company, but the value of which might be affected by the activities of their company.

It is important to note that for the duty to be infringed there does not have to be an actual conflict of interests, only a situation that might result in a conflict. This duty does not however apply to a conflict of interest arising from a transaction or arrangement between a director and the company which is governed by the longstanding requirement for the director to declare such interests.

The duty may well be relevant in corporate transactions where possible Situational Conflicts might arise:

  • Where directors are negotiating the potential sale of their company. Often in the context of a disposal directors will be engaged in a wide variety of discussions which might result in them having a conflict of interest. For example, the director might be involved in negotiations regarding the provision by him of consultancy services to the proposed acquirer; share options or other benefits he might receive as a result of the sale; a severance package he will receive as part of the transaction; or a new salary package if he will continue to be employed by the company. Given the numerous potential conflicts that can arise in this situation, directors of companies being marketed for sale might consider that from the point that the consideration of such a disposal commences they are faced with a Situational Conflict.
  • In a Management Buy Out. MBOs often present difficulties for those involved due to the potential divergence of interests faced by management who are both running the business and taking steps to acquire it. It is highly likely that, from the point that management determine they wish to buy their company or its assets, they will be in a Situational Conflict. It may be that at this point the management team have not yet declared their intent to the shareholders and other directors. Our opinion is that management teams should seek approval for their involvement in the buy out from any directors who are not part of the proposed MBO team at the earliest possible stage. It is likely that any such approval would be subject to certain conditions and some examples are considered below.
  • Where Directors are also trustees of their company's pension scheme. Directors are probably facing a Situational Conflict merely by virtue of holding both positions. However, this is particularly likely to be the case if the company is considering a corporate transaction which might be prejudicial the scheme in some respect. The Pensions Regulator imposes similar conflict rules.
  • Via connected persons. Suppose a company is considering a disposal of a division of its business. Once the marketing process is underway, it transpires that a director's brother is an investment manager with a firm of venture capitalists which has expressed an interest in acquiring the division. Here, there may be not actual conflict but the director may well have a Situational Conflict.

How to avoid breach of duty

Thankfully, given the wide nature of the duty, the legislation introduces for the first time the ability for conflict situations to be sanctioned at board level. Situational Conflicts will not amount to a breach of duty if authorisation for the continued existence of the situation has been given by the independent directors of the company's board.

However, for the board to have the power to give such authorisations:

  • Public companies' articles of association must expressly give them that power.
  • All existing private companies incorporated before 1 October 2008 must have passed a shareholder resolution giving them that power.

Boards of private companies incorporated after 1 October 2008 will automatically have the power unless their articles expressly prohibit them. If the situation is not authorised by the board there remains the possibility of it being sanctioned by prior or subsequent shareholder approval.

The change in law should be of particular concern to companies (whether public or private) with a diverse shareholder base.

We are advising boards of directors to:

  • Amend their articles or seek the necessary resolutions to give them the power to sanction Situational Conflicts.
  • Carefully consider any other positions they hold or other situations which they think may need authorising and consider whether any of their connected persons are in such a position.

Should boards authorise Situational Conflicts?

Why should the independent directors on a board authorise the existence of a Situational Conflict? The answer is that it might be in the company's best interest for the situation to exist. When considering whether or not to authorise, each director will need to have regard to his own duties including the duty to act in a way he considers, in good faith, will be most likely to promote the success of his company. Where the directors are asked to approve a situation that brings clear benefits to the company, for example access to industry or sector expertise, they should usually be able to determine that they are acting in the interests of the company in approving the situation. Directors should be able to approve a matter if, on balance, they think it is in the interests of the company to retain (or appoint) that particular director. However, the directors should always consider what effect the matter they are approving would have on the relevant director's ability to act in accordance with his wider duties.

Crucially, directors also need to consider how far any authorisation should go. They may wish to sanction a situation, but not wish to sanction all the consequences that flow from it. They may also wish to give themselves the power to revoke any authorisation at any point in the future

For example, in the scenarios set out above:

  • In an MBO, the independent directors (if any) may wish to allow the MBO team to proceed with trying to raise finance for the proposed buy-out subject to certain conditions, for example: restrictions regarding to whom they are able pass confidential information; the requirement that they must make certain information available to the company (for example any potential rival offer); and the obvious requirement that they do nothing with a view to reducing the value of the company and hence the price they are paying. Directors in an MBO scenario have always been, and remain, under a positive duty to act in their company's best interests irrespective of any conflicts presented by the MBO. However, unless considered properly there might now be the danger that the independent directors inadvertently sanction certain unacceptable conduct at the point they approve the situation generally.
  • In a scenario where no actual conflict presently exists, but the potential is anticipated, such as the example in which the director is related to the interested VC, the independent directors may wish to authorise the situation subject to the condition that the authorisation is only given up to the point where the VC is selected as the preferred acquirer, and from that point the authorisation is withdrawn and the director must absent himself from any discussions regarding the sale.

This change in law clearly requires some detailed thought on the part of directors. If directors require any further advice in respect of the new duty, or their duties at law generally, please contact Richard Wrigley on 0870 763 1586.

 

This article is a summary of the law of England & Wales as at September 2008. Its contents are general only and should not be relied upon in relation to any specific matter or transaction where advice should be sought.